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n 1979, Italy entered into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as a
founding member of the European Monetary System. After that date,
the country’s monetary policy was geared toward the maintenance
of exchange rate stability against its ERM partners, despite a number of
exchange parity realignments and with the exception of the period from
September 1992 to November 1996.1 The strength of the ERM commit-
ment was not uniform over time, either in terms of amplitude of the
fluctuation band2 or in terms of frequency of realignment of bilateral
parities. Despite this variability, however, changes in official rates—the
discount rate and the rate on fixed term advances—were overwhelm-
ingly linked throughout the ERM period to developments in foreign
exchange markets.
The broad exchange-rate stability objective was made operational as
a target range for the overnight interbank deposit rate. This target was
articulated as a corridor (in the 1990s, of typical width between 1 and 1.5
percent) effectively determined by the rates applied on Bank of Italy
lender-of-last-resort operations: the discount rate (at the lower edge) and
the rate on fixed-term advances (at the upper edge);3 and by the market-
determined tender rate on repos, the main tool used by the Bank to con-
duct its open market intervention, which steered the interbank rate with-
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Besides entry in the ERM, the year 1979 also wit-
nessed a formal shift in the broad goals of central bank
intervention. Until that year, Bank of Italy intervention
had been mostly intended to sustain the financing of
the public deficit, by means of its purchases of securi-
ties directly from the Treasury. By contrast, in 1979 the
goal of intervention was identified as controlling the
liquidity of the money market. Also, in 1981 the Bank
was granted formal independence in the pursuit of
this aim, when its obligation to acquire all Treasury
securities unsold to the public at primary auctions was
rescinded. However, despite these changes, the Bank
of Italy’s ability to control the monetary base and set
short-term interest rates remained constrained by a
number of institutional arrangements, including the
obligation it had to finance the Treasury through an
overdraft facility covering 14 percent of annual expen-
ditures. Furthermore, the power to modify the dis-
count rate was, until February 1992, assigned by law to
the Treasury, which acted upon proposal of the Bank of
Italy. In effect, the main step in the granting of inde-
pendence to the Bank was not completed until January
1, 1994, when Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty
became operational: The Treasury’s account at the
Bank of Italy (conto di tesoreria) was reformed, with clo-
sure of Bank credit to the Treasury and placement of
strict limits on minimum balances held by the
Treasury in its account at the Bank.
Other than the release of operational independ-
ence to the Bank of Italy, there were limited notable
changes in the Bank’s operating environment in the
course of the 1990s. Averaging of reserve requirements
was introduced in 1990, accompanied by a rise in the
fraction of free reserves for daily use by banks. Reserve
requirements were repeatedly lowered in the course 
of the decade.4 And, as discussed below, foreign
exchange swaps were included in 1992, alongside
standard repo operations, among the instruments for
intervention by the Bank in the open market.
Lender-of-Last-Resort Facilities
The Bank of Italy has engaged in lender-of-last-
resort operations (rifinanziamento) only with banks.
Three basic facilities were in place for this purpose:
ordinary advances and fixed-term advances (as stand-
ing facilities), and discounting. By the end of 1998,
financing under the three facilities equaled 33 trillion
lire (or 24 percent of the monetary base),5 up from a
more typical 21 trillion in 1997 (11 percent of the mon-
etary base).
Standing Facilities
Ordinary advances (anticipazioni ordinarie) were a
collateralized overdraft facility for commercial banks
accorded automatically, but whose amount was limit-
ed. Technically, the loan’s maturity was up to quarter-
ly, although in practice, loans were renewed routine-
ly. The discount rate was applied to this facility and
was normally set below market rates. Beyond that,
banks could borrow at a second facility fixed-term
advances (anticipazioni a scadenza fissa), representing
discretionary credit offered by the Bank of Italy,
which has, on occasion, been rationed. The rate
offered for fixed-term advances was harmonized
across banks in May 1991 and was set at the discount
rate plus a surcharge (the latter being between 1 and
1.5 percentage points in the 1990s, unless the facility
was accessed after 4 p.m., in which case a penalty of 8
percentage points over the discount rate was
assessed). The maturity of fixed-term advances
ranged between 1 and 32 days.
Acceptable collateral for these facilities included a
list of securities (stanziabili) including both govern-
ment and government-guaranteed securities, and
other claims such as cartelle fondiarie, securities issued
by istituti di credito fondiario and other special credit
institutions, securities in lire issued by international
organizations, securities issued by domestic agencies
explicitly admitted (state railway agency, public hold-
ing companies, and the like), and bank bonds. De
facto, the Bank has accepted almost exclusively public
sector securities, effectively eliminating any issue of
portfolio risk management. The value of securities
accepted as collateral was marked to market, discount-
ed by 15 percent for Treasury securities and by 20 per-
cent for other securities. When the gap between the
value of collateral and credit fell below one-half the
1 During this period, the lira was floating freely, and an eclectic
approach to monetary policy was followed. Targets for monetary
aggregates were announced, but changes in discount and repo rates
were implemented in response to a variety of indicators of inflation-
ary pressure. 
2 The lira was linked to a grid of bilateral bands of plus or
minus 6 percent amplitude from March 1979 to January 1990, plus or
minus 2.25 percent amplitude from 1990 to September 1993, and
plus or minus 15 percent amplitude from November 1996 until
December 1998.
3 While the interest rate corridor was typically effective, mar-
ket rates could occasionally fluctuate outside their corridor, particu-
larly as a consequence of the rationing of fixed-term advances.
4 In the most recent instance, required reserves fell by about 75
percent from 1997 to 1998, as Italy brought its system of reserve
requirements toward the European Monetary Union standard. 
5 A large share of this amount was connected with the restruc-
turing of banks in difficulty in that year.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 37
prescribed margin, credit was reduced to reestablish
initial conditions, or the bank was required to place
new securities as collateral (failing which, the Bank of
Italy could proceed with the sale of the collateral).
Discount Operations
The most venerable ingredient of Bank of Italy
financing of the banking sector, discounting (risconto)
has always played a negligible role in the Bank’s activ-
ities, largely reflecting the greater administrative com-
plexity with respect to advances. (Conceptually, the
main difference between discount and ordinary
advance was that the former was discretionary, while
the latter was automatic; the main difference between
discount and fixed-term advance was that the former
was offered at a subsidy rate, while the latter was
offered at a penalty rate.)
The Bank of Italy could offer credit to banks in
exchange for discounted deposit of securities includ-
ing Treasury securities, bank bonds (as long as quoted
and widely traded), and a limited set of other claims,
for example, agricultural bills of exchange (cambiali
agrarie). For such claims, the constraint was that their
maturity could not exceed four months, and that—
except for Treasury securities—they had to be under-
signed by at least two agents of known solvency. In
practice, the amount of securities other than Treasury
bills involved in discount operations has been negligi-
ble and has been limited, for many years, to cambiali
agrarie, the discounting of which has not played a role
in monetary management.
Open Market Operations
Open-market operations effectively began in Italy
in 1979. Since then, they have normally been conduct-
ed by a combination of repos and reverse repos (pronti
contro termine), implemented as variable-rate, discrimi-
natory auctions open to banks and a few other non-
bank primary Treasury dealers. Less frequently, the
Bank of Italy has engaged in outright purchases and
sales of Treasury securities. These were conducted in
the screen-based market (mercato telematico, or MTS)
for Treasury securities, which began to operate in 1988,
or directly through the phone. The periodicity and
maturity of these operations were not fixed; typically
there have been one or two auctions per week, with
repos’ maturity typically ranging between 10 and 20
days. At the end of 1998, the Bank of Italy was holding
under repo arrangement only 4 trillion lire (or 3 per-
cent of the monetary base), against 120 trillion held
outright (87 percent of the monetary base). The corre-
sponding figures for the end of 1997 were 29 trillion
(15 percent of the monetary base) and 152 trillion (77
percent of the monetary base).6 Data on stocks, how-
ever, provide little indication of the importance of var-
ious instruments in managing liquidity. In 1998, for
instance, repos destroyed 25 trillion lire of monetary
base, offsetting creation of 26 trillion lire through out-
right purchases and sales. Lender-of-last resort opera-
tions were responsible for destroying only 1 trillion
lire of monetary base.
Based on Article 41 of its statute, the Bank of Italy
could conduct open market operations using as coun-
terparts only securities issued or guaranteed by the
government. In practice, the Bank has dealt only in
Treasury securities for repos and outright operations.
For the conduct of the latter, the Bank has generally
found the MTS to operate smoothly, thanks to its high
liquidity and the transparency secured by its screen-
based nature. Only rarely, mostly in the 1995–97 peri-
od, has the Bank experienced difficulties. These
occurred only on occasion of unusually large opera-
tions, and were viewed by Bank officials as reflecting
technical problems of timing: The public seemed
unwilling to commit securities whose coupon pay-
ment was falling before the maturity of the repos, pre-
sumably reflecting problems connected with the
accounting and fiscal treatment of these operations.
The sporadic nature of these episodes, however,
caused them to be looked at without particular con-
cern by Bank officials.
Beginning in October 1992, the range of Bank
operations was expanded to include currency repos in
deutsche marks and dollars to relieve the burden of
traditional repos in the management of liquidity.7
Ordinarily, the stock of currency repos was kept at a
roughly constant volume and was routinely renewed
at maturity. Tender procedures for these swaps were
similar to those for repos, with auctions conducted
roughly every week or two, and maturity ranging
between one and three months. Foreign exchange (FX)
swaps had been eliminated by the end of 1998, in
preparation for the European Monetary Union (EMU).
They stood at 14 trillion lire at the end of 1997 (7 per-
6 Positive shares can add up to more than 100 percent, reflect-
ing negative contributions from sectors such as the Treasury’s pay-
ments account.
7 However, after the ERM crisis of 1992 drained most of the
Bank’s official reserves, currency swaps were also used as a tool to
supplement the Bank’s foreign exchange reserve holdings.38 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
cent of the monetary base), against a more typical 42
trillion lire at the end of 1995 (24 percent of the mone-
tary base).
Other than the noted introduction of FX swaps,
the Bank of Italy had given negligible consideration to
altering the stock of admissible collateral for open
market operations. This was the case despite the fact
that some observers have noted that the Bank’s prac-
tice of utilizing (virtually) only Treasury securities in
its operations may have acted as an incentive for
financial sector firms to hold these securities instead of
corporate debt, the market for which remains to a
large extent undeveloped in Italy.
Selected Fiscal Issues
Through the entire 1990s (and earlier) the coun-
try’s fiscal situation was never such as to cause worries
that the supply of outstanding public debt could
become insufficient to accommodate smooth conduct
of Bank of Italy operations. Through most of the pre-
EMU period, the Government of Italy’s gross debt had
been high and rising, reaching a peak of 125 percent of
GDP in 1994, with deficit/GDP ratios topping 10 per-
cent through the early 1990s. Fiscal retrenchment in
the run-up to EMU brought the ratio to GDP down to
about 116 percent by the end of 1998.
At the end of 1998, almost all Treasury debt (92
percent) was issued domestically. Banks and money
market funds held in their portfolios government
securities for 371 trillion lire, against required
reserves of 26 trillion, providing ample cushion for
the conduct of Bank of Italy operations. (Figures for
the end of 1997, more typical of the previous decade,
were 355 trillion and 90 trillion lire, respectively, as
reserve requirements were reduced dramatically in
1998.)
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